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 QUÉBEC/CANADA 
BUREAU DU DIRECTEUR PARLE-
MENTAIRE DU BUDGET 
Directeur parlementaire du budget, « Une 
introduction analytique au crédit d’impôt 
pour le transport en commun », 23 mai 
2017, 6 p. 
Environ 1,2 million de Canadiens 
paieront en moyenne 137 $ de plus 
d’impôt fédéral en 2018 en raison de 
l’élimination du crédit d’impôt fédéral 
pour le transport en commun 
Cette introduction analytique répond à la de-
mande du 3 mai 2017 faite par l'honorable Pierre 
Poilievre concernant les répercussions fiscales de 
l'élimination proposée du crédit d'impôt fédéral 
pour le transport en commun. 
FRASER INSTITUTE 
J. Clemens et M. Palacios, « Prime Minis-
ters and Government Spending: A Re-
trospective », Mai 2017, 15 p. 
Les dépenses gouvernementales par 
habitant effectuées par le gouvernement 
Trudeau sont les plus élevées depuis la 
Deuxième Guerre mondiale 
This bulletin measures the level of per-person pro-
gram spending undertaken annually by each 
prime minister, adjusting for inflation, since 1870.  
1867 to 1869 were excluded due to a lack of infla-
tion data. 
Per-person spending spiked during World War I 
(under Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden) but es-
sentially returned to pre-war levels once the war 
ended. The same is not true of World War II (Wil-
liam Lyon Mackenzie King). Per-person spending 
stabilized at a permanently higher level after the 
end of that war. 
The highest single year of per-person spending 
($8,375) between 1870 and 2017 was in the 2009 
recession under Prime Minister Harper. 
 
Prime Minister Arthur Meighen (1920 – 1921) rec-
orded the largest average annual decline in per-
person spending (-23.1%). That decline, however, 
is largely explained by the rapid drop in expendi-
tures following World War I. 
Among post-World War II prime ministers, Louis 
St. Laurent oversaw the largest annual average 
increase in per-person spending (7.0%), though 
this spending was partly influenced by the Korean 
War. 
 
Our current prime minister, Justin Trudeau, has 
the third-highest average annual per-person 
spending increases (5.2%). This is almost a full 
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percentage point higher than his father, Pierre E. 
Trudeau, who recorded average annual increases 
of 4.5%. 
Prime Minister Joe Clark holds the record for the 
largest average annual post-World War II decline 
in per-person spending (4.8%), though his tenure 
was less than a year. 
Both Prime Ministers Brian Mulroney and Jean 
Chretien recorded average annual per-person 
spending declines of 0.3%. 
    ÉTATS-UNIS 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
C. Marr, C-C Huang, B. DeBot et G. Her-
rera, « Trump Tax Plan’s Pass-Through 
Tax Break Would Provide Massive Wind-
fall to the Wealthy », 22 mai 2017, 11 p.  
Le passage du taux d'imposition 
corporatif américain de 35 % à 15 % 
profitera à 68 % des actionnaires ayant 
un revenu de plus d'un million, leur 
conférant en moyenne une économie 
d'impôt de 114 000 $ US 
A key reason why President Trump’s tax plan is 
costly and heavily tilted to the wealthiest 
households is its special, much lower top rate for 
“pass-through” business income.1 This is income 
from businesses such as partnerships, S corpora-
tions, and sole proprietorships claimed on individ-
ual tax returns — that is, it “passes through” to 
the business owners and is taxed at the owners’ 
individual tax rates (the same rates that apply to 
wages and salaries). These businesses already 
have the advantage of being exempt from the cor-
porate tax on profits and taxes on dividends. Un-
der the 
Trump plan, pass-through income would be taxed 
at no more than 15 percent — far below the 39.6 
percent top rate that now applies to pass-through 
income. This would provide a massive windfall to 
the very wealthy and has sometimes been referred 
to as the “Trump loophole” because Donald 
Trump exemplifies the type of business owner 
whom it would most benefit 
CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY 
PRIORITIES (CBPP) 
C-C. Huang et B. DeBot, « House Health 
Bill: Tax Cuts for Wealthy, Insurers, and 
Drug Companies Paid for by Low- and 
Middle-Income Families », 22 mai 2017, 
8 p.  
Les baisses d'impôt pour les riches et les 
entreprises coûteront cher aux familles à 
faible et moyen revenu en ce qui 
concerne leur assurance santé 
The House-passed bill to repeal and replace the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) went through various 
changes in the House, but large tax cuts for the 
wealthy and corporations remained at its core 
throughout. The bill would eliminate ACA taxes 
on wealthy households and insurance and drug 
companies and greatly expand tax-sheltering op-
portunities for high-income people. These tax cuts 
(plus several smaller ones) would cost $660 billion 
over 2017 to 2026. The bill would pay for them 
with cuts hitting low- and moderate income fami-
lies: it would cut and radically restructure Medi-
caid, dramatically scale back premium tax credits 
that low- and moderate-income families use to 
purchase marketplace health coverage, and elimi-
nate cost-sharing subsidies that lower out-of-




CBO, « Cost Estimate of H.R. 1628 Ame-
rican Health Care Act of 2017 », 24 mai 
2017, 41 p. 
La réforme de la santé devrait réduire le 
déficit de 119 milliards de dollars pour la 
période 2017-2026 
The Congressional Budget Office and the staff of 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have com-
pleted an estimate of the direct spending and rev-
enue effects of H.R. 1628, the American Health 
Care Act of 2017, as passed by the House of Rep-
resentatives. CBO and JCT estimate that enact-
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ing that version of H.R. 1628 would reduce the cu-
mulative federal deficit over the 2017-2026 period 
by $119 billion. That amount is $32 billion less 
than the estimated net savings for the version of 
H.R. 1628 that was posted on the website of the 
House Committee on Rules on March 22, 2017, in-
corporating manager’s amendments 4, 5, 24, and 
25. (CBO issued a cost estimate for that earlier 
version of the legislation on March 23, 2017.)  
In comparison with the estimates for the previous 
version of the act, under the House passed act, the 
number of people with health insurance would, by 
CBO and JCT’s estimates, be slightly higher and 
average premiums for insurance purchased indi-
vidually—that is, nongroup insurance—would be 
lower, in part because the insurance, on average, 
would pay for a smaller proportion of health care 
costs. In addition, the agencies expect that some 
people would use the tax credits authorized by the 
act to purchase policies that would not cover major 
medical risks and that are not counted as insur-
ance in this cost estimate. 
INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC  POLICY (ITEP) 
S. Pudelski et C. Davis, « Public Loss Pri-
vate Gain: How School Voucher Tax Shel-
ters Undermine Public Education », 
17 mai 2017, 14 p. 
Lorsqu'un investisseur privé fait 
donation d'un titre boursier à une école 
privée, il peut recevoir davantage en 
retour d'impôt que la valeur du titre 
One of the most important functions of govern-
ment is to maintain a high-quality public educa-
tion system. In many states, however, this objec-
tive is being undermined by tax policies that redi-
rect public dollars for K–12 education toward pri-
vate schools. Seventeen states currently divert a 
total of over $1 billion per year toward private 
schools via tax credits. Nine of these states’ credits 
are so lucrative that they offer some upper-income 
taxpayers a risk-free profit on contributions they 
make to fund private school scholarships.1 Now, 
federal legislation has been introduced that would 
further the ability of wealthy individuals to under-
mine the public education system and profit off 
their donations to nonprofits serving private 
schools. Unlike most state laws, the federal legis-
lation does not even cap the amount of funds that 
could be redirected from the Treasury into unac-
countable, nonprofit organizations supplementing 
tuition at private schools. The loss of federal and 
state revenue directed at public schools would 
weaken the ability of public schools to serve in-
creasing numbers of students in poverty as well as 
students with disabilities and English-language 
learners. We suggest that rather than expand 
these voucher tax shelters at the federal level, 
Congressional efforts to reform the tax code 
should be used as an opportunity to eliminate cur-
rent loopholes that encourage participation in 
these voucher schemes. 
TAX FOUNDATION 
K. Pomerleau, « How the Border Adjust-
ment Helps Fix Business Taxation in the 
United States », 23 mai 2017, 9 p. 
Réduire le taux d'imposition corporatif, 
tout en taxant sur une base de 
destination, pourrait être bénéfique pour 
l'économie américaine  
The House GOP’s tax reform proposal would re-
place the current 35 percent corporate income tax 
with a 20 percent “destination-based cash-flow 
tax.” Part of this tax would be the “border adjust-
ment,” which would apply the tax to all goods and 
services sold in the United States. The border ad-
justment would be an elegant way to eliminate 
base erosion and profit shifting by multinational 
corporations. It would also allow for the elimina-
tion of complex anti-base erosion provisions, 
which would improve the competitiveness of the 
U.S. tax code. It would also raise revenue over the 
budget window, which helps fund the transition to 
a cash-flow tax, which we estimate would boost 







   International 
ORGANISATION DE COOPÉRA-
TION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
ÉCONOMIQUES (OCDE) 
OCDE, « Perspectives économiques en 
Afrique 2017 : Entrepreneuriat et indus-
trialisation », 22 mai 2017, 317 p. 
Les revenus fiscaux des pays africains 
sont toujours insuffisants pour financer 
les missions de l’État  
Les Perspectives économiques en Afrique 
2017 dressent l’état actuel du continent et livrent 
des prévisions économiques à deux ans. Ce rap-
port annuel examine la performance de l’Afrique 
dans des domaines essentiels : macroéconomie, 
flux financiers extérieurs et recettes fiscales, com-
merce et intégration régionale, développement 
humain et gouvernance. Pour cette 16e édition, les 
Perspectives économiques en Afrique passent au 
crible la question du rôle des entrepreneurs dans 
l’industrialisation du continent. Le rapport pro-
pose des solutions pratiques que les gouverne-
ments africains peuvent adopter pour mettre en 
place des stratégies d’industrialisation efficaces. 
Des politiques favorisant les compétences, les re-
groupements d’entreprises (clusters) et le finance-
ment lèveraient des contraintes majeures rencon-
trées actuellement par les entreprises privées afri-
caines. 
Des notes pays offrent une synthèse des tendances 
récentes de l'économie, des prévisions de crois-
sance du produit intérieur brut pour 2017 et 2018, 
et des principaux enjeux dans chacun des 54 pays 
africains. Une annexe statistique (disponible en 
ligne uniquement) permet de comparer les va-
riables économiques, sociales et politiques propres 






TION ET DE DÉVELOPPEMENT 
ÉCONOMIQUES (OCDE) 
OCDE, « Relever les défis fiscaux posés 
par l'économie numérique, Action 1 - Rap-
port final 2015 » 4 mai 2017, 328 p. 
Trois principales options de 
changements fiscaux sont étudiées pour 
améliorer la perception des recettes 
provenant de l’économie numérique 
L’essor de l’économie numérique soulève des défis 
qui se rapportent à la fiscalité internationale. Ce 
rapport analyse en détail ces défis. Il observe que 
l’économie numérique s’impose de plus en plus 
comme l’économie au sens propre, de sorte qu’il se-
rait difficile, voire impossible, de l’isoler du reste 
de l’économie à des fins fiscales. Il ajoute toutefois 
que certains modèles économiques et attributs es-
sentiels de l’économie numérique peuvent exacer-
ber les risques de BEPS, et décrit les effets atten-
dus des mesures issues de l’ensemble des actions 
qui constituent le projet BEPS. Il présente égale-
ment les règles et mécanismes d’application qui 
ont été définis pour faciliter la collecte de la taxe 
sur la valeur ajoutée (TVA) à partir du pays où se 
trouve le consommateur lors de transactions 
transfrontalières entre entreprises et consomma-
teurs, et qui permettront d’établir des règles du 
jeu équitables entre fournisseurs nationaux et 
étrangers. Enfin, le rapport étudie et analyse des 
solutions possibles aux défis fiscaux de plus large 
portée posés par l’économie numérique, et sou-
ligne la nécessité de suivre les évolutions de l’éco-
nomie numérique au fil du temps. 
RESOLUTION FOUNDATION 
A. Corlett, « A Matter of Tax: Pre-election 
Briefing on the Main Parties’ Tax Poli-
cies », 16 mai 2017, 18 p. 
L’érosion de la base d’imposition des 
sociétés constitue un enjeu important 
pour les cinq prochaines années 
There is much that is unusual about the 2017 gen-
eral election, from its surprise announcement to 
the dominance of a single issue – Brexit – on 
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which the parties themselves remain split. Partic-
ularly remarkable is the extent to which the tax 
debate has so far focused more on options for 
tax rises rather than tax cuts. 
The backdrop for this debate is the multitude of 
tax policies delivered over the last seven years – a 
mix of tax rises, tax cuts and some limited tax re-
forms. These related in part to deficit reduction, 
but political determination to lower income and 
corporation taxes has also been key, with most tax 
increases funding tax cuts elsewhere. 
Ahead of the 2015 election, all the major parties 
called for income tax cuts, despite the deficit. But 
two years on, the ground appears to have shifted. 
A smaller but still significant budget deficit re-
mains, with elevated debt and looming demo-
graphic pressures sharpening the case for a con-
tinued focus on the public finances. There is evi-
dence that public opinion has moved on too, and of 
course those earlier promises have reduced the 
scope for more tax cuts in the years to come. Add 
in continued uncertainty about the costs and op-
portunities that leaving the EU will present – and 
the altered focus of the tax debate appears under-
standable. 
In this paper – part of our pre-election series – we 
look at the range of policies which have emerged 
in this pre-election campaign to date. Some of our 
analysis is necessarily speculative at this stage 
but a lot has already been revealed (not least 
through a full scale leak of the Labour manifesto). 
RESOLUTION FOUNDATION 
D. Finch, « Still Just About Managing? 
Pre-election Briefing on the Main Politi-
cal Parties Welfare Policies », 21 mai 
2017, 16 p. 
Les coupes dans les programmes qui ont 
déjà été annoncées affecteront les 
familles à faible revenu pendant 
plusieurs années et leurs effets 
commencent à peine à se faire sentir  
Our pre-election series of briefing notes have so 
far centred on the main parties’ approaches to def-
icit reduction and to tax. To complete the fiscal 
‘set’ we must also consider their take on welfare. 
In doing so, we are better placed to comment on 
the parties’ positions thanks to the publication of 
their manifestos. These are, to greater and lesser 
extents, revealing. There are some clear commit-
ments, but also some unexpected omissions. 
What’s clear is that there is little appetite for fur-
ther radical welfare reform. That’s understanda-
ble when substantial reform is already taking 
place with the roll-out of Universal Credit taking 
all of the next parliament and disability and pen-
sion reform underway. But positive visions for 
welfare reform is not the only big gap. You would 
expect significant detail on the parties approach 
to the generosity of working age welfare given that 
whoever wins this election will inherit the deliv-
ery of welfare cuts totalling over £14 billion a year 
by 2021 – the result of commitments made to ma-
jor welfare cuts in the 2015 Conservative mani-
festo. The plans set out by Chancellor Osborne in 
2015 included a four year freeze to most working-
age benefits; reduced support for working fami-
lies, particularly those with children; and the lim-
iting of support for families with children. The ma-
jority of these cuts are yet to take effect with low 
inflation in previous years limiting their bite, UC 
still being rolled out and support for children only 
affecting new births from April 2017. The result is 
that £9 billion of cuts that will directly impact on 
household incomes are set to come in the next par-
liament. 
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